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THE CANONICAL
CONCEPT OF MARITAL
CONSENT: ROMAN LAW
INFLUENCES
REV. JOSEPH N. PERRY*
Nuptias non concubitus sed consensus facit.'
Examining the institutions of ancient Roman life, one has to marvel
at Roman marriage, conubium.2 Roman law bears its own confusion with
realities like manumission, prescription, and a host of different contracts.
Marriage, however, was remarkably uncomplicated chiefly because
conubium had extremely little social accountability. We cite this because
marriage today in both civil and religious spheres is just the oppo-
site-complicated, heavily accountable to the communio and weighed
down with any number of legal prescriptions. Rome, on the other hand,
enjoyed marriage. The institution for all its freedoms served the Republic
(451-125 B.C.) and the Empire (125 B.C.-A.D. 180) well.' Family life en-
joyed stability, perhaps greater stability than during recent times.
Unfortunately, we may be at a biased vantage point to analyze Ro-
man marriage. Christianity is weighed down with a heavy baggage of tra-
dition and its own problems regulating marriage in law. But we look at
our legal patrimony for no other reason than that Rome alone was our
teacher. Christian marriage became, in some ways, a reaction to the Ro-
man mores, while at the same time, the institution was heavily influenced
by common law trends, especially regarding the efficient cause of mar-
riage, consent.
Christianity in the West lived and breathed Rome. Although Rome
* Tribunal, Archdiocese of Milwaukee.
DIGEST 30.1.17 (not copulation, but consent creates marriage).
2 Conubium described marriages, or the civil right to marry, in Roman society. See P. COR-
BETT, THE ROMAN LAW OF MARRIAGE 24 (1930); B. NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN
LAW 64-65 (1962).
I ustae nuptiae described marriages of Roman citizens only, not those of foreigners (per-
egrini) or slaves (servi). See B. NICHOLAS, supra note 2, at 83.
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attempted to drown Christianity in its own blood for the first three cen-
turies of the infant faith's existence, Rome's profound influence on us
cannot be underestimated. We adopted our ecclesial legal system pattern-
ing it after mother Rome. Prior to the fifth century barbaric invasions,
Christians knew no other legal system. Call it skillful adaptation. We did
with Rome what Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) would do with Aristotle
(384-348 B.C.)-squeeze holiness out of what was pagan! In the Golden
Age, Rome believed herself eternal. She turned out mortal, but left an
eternal mark on Western life. For all her virtues and vices, we cannot
spurn her.
For all its lack of sanctions, conubium in the classical period was
strikingly stable." There was no ceremonial rite called for in law, no sym-
bolic acts necessary, no officiant priest or magistrate and no public regis-
tration mandated. Augustus was fascinated with a needed census of peo-
ple in his time, but marriage records served no useful purpose and none
were kept. Confarreatio was an optional ritual for the patricians and
those of the priestly class. This involved a solemn ceremony with a wheat
cake, broken and eaten by the couple. 5
Marriage was purely a social status, hardly a contractus. It was part
of the ius personae (the law of persons). The best of Roman sentiments
were a part of conubium. In classical times, it called for the purest exer-
cise of free will. Conubium was purely humanistically free and freely dis-
soluble, yet socially understood for life. Roman marriage displayed the
fundamental "stuff" of human nature-to want human affection to last
forever. Marriage for life was a deeply human sentiment before Christian-
ity made it an imperative. Conubium was monogamous. What surprises
the student of history is that concubinage was socially acceptable even for
the married, although understood as extra-legal and as without affectio
maritalis when enjoyed with anyone other than freeborn and respectable
women. Christianity established strict monogamy as a norm in lieu of
Judaeic roots after the instruction of Christ.' Concubinage was forbidden
by the time of Emperor Justinian (r. A.D. 527-565).
Rome had nothing to apologize for with her idea and practice of mar-
riage. Humanitas emphasized the value and dignity of the human person
that was uniquely and sometimes excessively individualistic. By the time
of Augustus (18 B.C.) the birth rate of Romans was so low because of the
freedom of marriage that favors and concessions were granted citizens to
increase family size, i.e., sanguis Romanus.
Although human desires encouraged marriage for life, Romans un-
The last 150 years before Christ are considered the formative period of Roman law. See B.
NICHOLAS, supra note 2, at 34.
See id. at 82.
' Matthew 19:3-6.
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derstood that circumstances in the human situation could change. Thus,
the marriage could end as freely as it was made either by mutual agree-
ment or announcement by one of the parties.' No suits, sanctions, or obli-
gations to the spouses, children, or society were envisioned. Romans ap-
pear to have been concerned more with how marriage came into existence
rather than with the strength of a marital relationship or any such reality
which mandated permanence. Indissolubility simply spoke to no particu-
lar value in Roman life, nor to the spirit of humanitas.
For most of their observable history, Romans focused on consent as
the constitutional element of marriage. In the Republic, marriage was pa-
triarchal. The uxor (wife) was in manu mariti (in the hand/power of the
husband).8 The spirit of humanitas, however, later freed marriage, and
therefore women, by the end of the second century B.C. Marriage re-
mained free thereafter.' Gaius (2d cent. A.D.) in his Institutiones, stated
the following about valid marriages: legitimae sunt nuptiae, si Romanus
Romanam nuptiis intervenientibus vel consensu ducat uxorem.10 About
a century later, the Roman jurist Modestinus (d. A.D. 237), spoke of mar-
riage being much more than a status differentiated from concubinage by a
unique type of consent. Marriage for him embraced the civil and religious
aspects of the couple's lives-the totality of the human relationship.
Christians could sympathize with his conception: nuptiae sunt coniunctio
maris et feminae, et consortium omnis vitae, divini et humani iuris
communicatio. 1
Consent is a profound human act. It defies conclusive description.
Consent was an intricate part of the Roman law on persons; it included
family, guardianship, property, contracts, wills, and adoption. Without
human consent, most of these legal institutions simply had no life. Thus,
at the most fundamental level, consent created the status of Roman mar-
riage, found either in the consent given by the pater potestas, the
epitholomia (the uxor's homage now to the husband's household goods),
or the deductio uxoris ad domum mariti (the going down to the hus-
band's house). With these acts, Romans were looking for external evi-
dence demonstrating the existence of a marriage as opposed to merely an
agreement to cohabit. 2 This external evidence was seen as fundamental
to the clarity of the social status. Citing evidence in law was simply a
B. NICHOLAS, supra note 2, at 85-86.
8 L. CURZON, ROMAN LAW 42 (1966).
F. SCHULZ, CLASSICAL ROMAN LAW 104 (1951).
'0 INSTITUTES (GAIUS) 1.4 (lawful marriages are those which involve consent, if they are be-
tween Roman citizens).
" DIGEST 23.2.1 (a union between a man and woman, an association for the whole of life in
which the two have the same civil and religious rights).
" See B. NICHOLAS, supra note 2, at 81.
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matter of good reasoning and common sense, and the Romans were un-
mistakably reasonable and sensible people.
Conubium's only legal effect was the legitimate status of children and
inheritance rights."3 Law exists for order in the community. Law is consis-
tent in this sense in that it demands the cold, hard facts of evidence.
Hence, to demonstrate that in this instance we have marriage, and in this
instance we do not have marriage, there must be some external sign in
the human order of the internal consent.
It is important to note here that there is a difference between the
methodology of the lawyer and that of the theologian. Most early Chris-
tian thinkers on marriage were theologians. Church law on marriage was
refined much later, beginning in the Middle Ages. When the theologian
today asks what marriage is, he is likely to describe it as a sacred rela-
tionship, a union, or a sign of God's fidelity. In other words, the theolo-
gian attempts to explain the mystery of Christian marriage, whereas law
is not capable of dealing with mystery. The law of marriage must define
by clear signs when we have anything akin to the mystery of the sacra-
ment of marriage. Traditionally, the contractual agreement has provided
the necessary external evidence. Ecclesial law is rooted in Christian mys-
teries, but law and theology are not identical.
Christianity adopted this legal notion of consent readily, but suc-
ceeded in stripping the social status of marriage of the freedom it enjoyed
under Roman common law. For a long time, the marriages of Christians
were regulated by local custom and law. Eventually, the church became a
legal community and began developing her own law, prohibiting marriage
within certain degrees of blood relationship as the Romans did," and dis-
couraging secret and clandestine marriages forbidden by the Montanist
and Tertullian (2d cent. A.D.), who labelled such attempts at marriage as
adultery and fornication. Ignatius of Antioch (2d cent. A.D.) and Je-
rome (A.D. 345-419), and Ambrose (A.D. 339-397) all cautioned the faith-
ful against mixed marriages with the heathens or pagans." From the Ro-
, Legitimization of offspring from concubinage was not possible until shortly before the
reign of Emperor Justinian (A.D. 527). Id. at 85. Iustae nuptiae automatically conferred
rights of inheritance. See id. at 83.
" Iustae nuptiae was forbidden in the direct line of descendents and in the collateral line
(kinship) up to and including the sixth degree. Under the Roman method of computation
there are as many degrees -as there are generations (tot gradus sunt quot generationes). See
P. CORBEr, supra note 2, at 47-51.
" de Pudicitia, c.4, et de monogamia, n.15,-occultae coniugationes id est non prius apud
Ecclesiam professae iuxta moechiam et fornicationem periclitantur (secret unions, those
which have not been professed before the church are in danger of amounting to adultery
and fornication).
" Ignatius of Antioch, epistula ad Polycarpum (A.D. 107); Ambrose, de Abr., 1, 9, and
epistula ad episcoppis; Jerome, Adv., 10 v. "great numbers of christian women despise the
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man prescription of marriage as a natural, social institution, Christianity
transferred marriage into an acta religionis, exhorting Christians to ap-
preciate the religious character of marriage and its source of grace and
blessing.
The church began to see more than a marital affection differentiating
the marriage relationship from concubinage or any other relationship akin
to it. For Christians, marriage emerged with communitarian effects and
transcendent ends for the baptized. The Roman institution was purely
human, individualistic and free, without social accountability. For the
Christian, its indissoluble character aids the spiritual life of man here and
in the future kingdom. We need not emphasize the obvious disparity be-
tween the Roman and Christian conceptions, based on two entirely differ-
ent world views. The Christian experience affords a drastic change in the
human experience of marriage, at least insofar as Christianity affected the
entire Western world.
The early church fathers and theologians entertained the idea of
marriage's causality further. Ambrose suggested a real marriage came to
be pacto coniugdli, i.e., at the time of betrothal, desponsatio.17 Augustine
(A.D. 354-430) spoke of marriage as sacred and indissoluble, calling the
singular marriage of Mary and Joseph a true marriage, although it is be-
lieved to have existed without consummation."8
The Emperor Justinian (r. A.D. 527-565) adopted and Christianized
decadent Roman law for the purpose of the Byzantine Empire. He saw
marriage as a union between man and woman enjoying a divine privilege
which could not take place without consent. The Emperor could not es-
cape true Roman roots. Even through the pater potestas, consent was
still believed valid when a woman was in her father's household in Byzan-
tine Christianity. Justinian enumerated at length the degrees of blood re-
lationship between whom marriage was prohibited, adding to what Ro-
man common law had already provided,19 and clarified what was a
previous attempt by the Emperor Theodosius (A.D. 438) to compile an-
cient and contemporary law useful for the Empire.2 0
Pope Gregory II (r. 715-731) carried on the theological reflection, ti-
tling mere espousal coniuges (marital union). Whereas the Romans had
searched for an identifiable and external reality that demonstrated the
coming-to-be of conubium, Christians were now wrestling with the ques-
tion of what constituted marriage before God. In fact, the church still
wrestles with this question.
Apostles command and marry heathens!"
" de Abr., 1, 9.
" Augustine, de nuptiis et concupiscentia, bib., 1, c.11, et de bono coniugali.
" See DIGEST 23.2; note 12 infra.
'o CODE THEOD. 16.3.7.1.
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The discussion came to a dramatic point in the twelfth century, illus-
trated by the debate between two French universities, Bologna and Paris.
Gratian the monk led the Bologna school, stating that the act of consum-
mation completed the act of consent given in marriage and that consum-
mation was necessary for marriage's sacramentality. 12 Gratian was search-
ing for an external sign in the Christian order. His belief was based on a
fourth century theory advanced by one archbishop, Hincmar of Rheims.
The sacramental theologian, Peter Lombard (1164) disagreed, stating
consent alone was efficient cause for the sacramentality of marriage. The
canonist, Pope Alexander III, concurred with Lombard, essentially plac-
ing an end to the discussion. From this point on, it became a matter of
church doctrine that, at the most fundamental level, consent alone cre-
ates Christian marriage in iure. Thereupon, Christianity would exercise a
dominant influence on Western life and marriage.
By the Middle Ages, the Church had succeeded in bringing marriage
under control by a system of impediments, that is, circumstances and
conditions, both divine and natural, which would preclude valid marital
consent. The first listings of these impediments appeared at the end of
the twelfth century. There were no exhaustive lists. Peter Lombard had
one such list. Gratian listed sixteen, though his was not definitive.22 Ca-
tholicism later would emphasize the necessity of the freedom of consent
with what vitiates it, e.g., force, fear, fraud, conditional consent. The
Council of Trent (1545-1563) would later add abduction and clandestiny
to the list. Consanguinity-affinity prohibitions were already formulating
by the time of the fourth and sixth century councils.
Not to be underestimated is scholastic philosophy's contribution to
the discussion. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) proposed that marriage was
a communio vitae (communion of life).2 3 One first sees now a train of
thought developing with the causality inherent in the institution. The Ro-
mans did not reflect that much on marriage. They lived and enjoyed mar-
riage. Unknown to the pagan ancients, they began the significant discus-
sion. Affectio maritalis distinguished iustae nuptiae from concubinage in
Roman common law of the classical period. For Catholicism, love was not
essential to their notion of the marriage contract. In fact, we still are not
" Corpus Iuris Canonici, Gratian, causam xxviii, q.2.
22 Corpus luris Canonici, Gratian, causam xxvii, q.1. viduae religioso habito abiecto; viduis
et virginbus religionis proposito; clericus deponatur; laicus excommunicetur; bigamos;
monachus et virgo; professam continentiam, etc. The Old Catholic Encyclopedia also lists
medieval impediments as: votum, conditio, violentia, spirituali, proximitas, error, dis-
similisque ides, culpa, dies vetitus, honor, ordo ligatio, sanguis, quae sit affinis, quique
coire nequibit, additur his aetas, habitum coniunge furoris. His interdictum subditur eccle-
siae. Haec si canonico vis consentire rigore te de iure vetant subire tori. 7 OLD CATHOLIC
ENCYCLOPEDIA 696 (Herbermann ed. 1913); cf. CODE OF CANON LAW (1917).
2 See de objecto consensu matrimonis in SUMMA THEOLOGIAE q.1, art. 1 (Supp.).
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comfortable with where this essential human emotion fits into the con-
tract, as we have defined it over the centuries. Love is not an essential
component of contracts of any kind, at least as we have inherited con-
tracts from the Romans. And with ecclesial (canon) law, one could con-
ceivably have a true marriage without love or at least without its imper-
fect expression. We are still working on this.
Christus Dominus ad sacramenti dignitatem evexit ipsum contrac-
turn matrimonialem inter baptizatos.24 This is an article of belief incor-
porated into the body of law by the legislator. From this canonical state-
ment, all ecclesial law on marriage proceeds.
The medieval canonists had already chosen the notion of contract to
define marriage because it facilitated measuring the exigencies of consent
and suited scholastic philosophical categories as well as facilitated litiga-
tion in the church courts. There was no such reality as litigation with
Roman conubium. In comparison, Roman marriage appeared to be a
superformalized kind of friendship between the opposite sex, freely begun
and freely ended by means of consent. Romans had no notion whatsoever
of marriage being a contract between parties. Marriage contract within
Catholicism, however, freely consented to, now involved duties and obli-
gations never imagined by the Romans.
The church's control over the marriages of her faithful ,came drasti-
cally as an issue at the Council of Trent (1545-1563). After the painful
experience with the reformers, there existed intense concern for renewed
order and pristine uniformity. With the decree Tametsi, Catholicism pro-
nounced its vicarious power over the Christian marriage bond.2 5 The issue
was not without long debate by the bishops. The question: If consent is
all that is needed for true and valid marriage, why require a public form?
Some bishops feared the loss of a doctrine supported heavily by tradition.
The church now required consent to be enacted in forma publica, i.e.,
before a bishop or priest and two witnesses, for no other reason than to
check secret marriages and the resulting problems of legitimacy, inheri-
tance rights, and moral chaos, to say nothing of the rights of the parties
themselves and the protection of the sacrament. The requirement of
"form" remains today indispensable for validity.
Matrimonium facit partiurn consensus inter personas iure habiles
legitime manifestatus; qui nulla humana potestate suppleri valet.2 The
Romans would have no difficulty with this statement as it stands. But the
4 CODE OF CANON LAW Canon 1012 (1917) (Christ the Lord has raised to the dignity of a
sacrament, the marriage contract itself, between the baptized).
'5 Concilio Tridentini, sessio 24, Nov. 11, 1563, de reformatio matrimonis, tit. xvii.
" CODE OF CANON LAW Canon 1081 (1) (1917) (Marriage is effected by the consent of the
parties lawfully expressed between persons who are capable according to law, and this con-
sent no human power can supply).
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church believes marital consent when contracted between the baptized is
always a sacrament. The sacrament of marriage is said today to be a sign
in the existential order of Christ's love and fidelity to His Church. The
church has always felt a need to reflect this fidelity of Christ in the
human experience.2 7 Christian marriage therefore becomes an experience
of pure faith, an extraordinary lifestyle. With this understanding of the
mysteries, christians cannot conceive of marriage as anything but indis-
soluble, because God has been constant with His people.
The discussion developed still further at Vatican Council 11 (1962-
1965). The bishops titled marriage "communio vitae."' 8 Was this not, in
effect, Modestinus and Aquinas revisited? The council described for the
first time the importance of conjugal love and the ingredients of consent.
The contractual agreement is understood now not just as a cerebral, ver-
bally communicated intention, but as a disposition that involves the spiri-
tual, the psychological, and the physical. It is a much broader consent,
complimenting a growth in understanding, but now more difficult to mea-
sure. Some are able to qualify for this kind of marriage, others not. It is
more than the ius ad corpus2 9 Rather, it is, fundamentally the capacity
to form a communion of life with another, and to supply a mutual help
that gives true meaning and purpose to the conjugal act.
We have yet to work with this developed understanding of consent in
marriage. The ramifications are immense. Foedus (covenant) is now sug-
gested to replace contractus because of its fuller biblical sense. The cove-
nant of marriage necessarily highlights the faith dimension of marriage.
Some will argue that "contract" is clearer for sake of legal language and
methodology. The term, however, certainly does not adequately describe
the mystery of Christian marriage. The word has been useful because law
has needed the concrete image to assess whether a given marriage repre-
sents the sacrament. The church could have chosen some other model to
determine clear consent. Nevertheless, it would appear inconceivable that
the civil or church society would dispense with the need to ascertain the
external sign of consent in marriage, precisely because of the institution's
great accountability to the community.
#1 Matrimoniale foedus quo vir et mulier intimam inter se constituunt
totius vitae communionem, indole sua naturali ad bonum coniugum atque
ad prolis procreationem et educationem ordinatam, a Christo Domino ad
sacramenti dignitatem inter baptizatos evectum est.
#2 Quare inter baptizatos nequit matrimonialis contractus validus consis-
27 See Ephesians 5:25-33.
28 Gaudiam et Spes (The Church in the Modern World) II, 1, 48.
29 CODE OF CANON LAW Canon 1081(2) (1917) (the right over the body .. for those acts apt
for generation).
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tere, quin sit eo ipso sacramentum.30
In effect, the church took a Roman concept, consent in marriage, and
developed it through history, casting it in the legal frame of the Roman
contract of the consensual type, to clarify what now has emerged as the
institution's social and religious accountability. If the Romans could see
us today!
There are some unresolved difficulties as yet with "marriage con-
sent." The 1975 schema of the new code of law on marriage, commis-
sioned out of the Second Vatican Council, reflects in part the present-day
growth in our understanding of the mystery. The important thing is that
the church is still reflecting on marriage and today, more than ever, ad-
mits to new growth in her understanding.
One of our weaknesses is that those who have lived Christian mar-
riages have hardly written about them, especially the happy marriages.
Most of our literature concerns itself with marital breakdown and needed
adjustment. Those who have often written about marriage are celibates
who obviously have not lived the mystery!
ao Proposed schema, de matrimonis, 1975, norm 242. Compare with CODE OF CANON LAW
Canon 1012 (1917). (#1 The matrimonial covenant between baptized persons, by which a
man and a woman constitute together a communion of the whole of life, is ordered by its
natural character to the good of the spouses and to the procreation and education of chil-
dren, has been raised by Christ the Lord to the dignity of a sacrament. #2 Therefore, it is
impossible for a valid contract of marriage between baptized persons to exist without being
by that very fact a sacrament.).
